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In the 1990 decision of Murphy v. Brentwood District Council, I 
the British House of Lords unanimously overruled the landmark judge-
ment in Anns v. Merton District Council .2 In his judgement, Lord Keith 
states: 
My Lords, I would hold that Anns was wrongly decided 
as regards the scope of any private law duty of care 
resting on local authorities in relation to their function 
of taking steps to secure compliance with building 
byelaws or regulations ... 3 
This decision runs contrary to the Supreme Court of Canada decision in 
Kamloops v. Nielsen.4 In light of this development, it is valuable to 
speculate upon whether Murphy will affect the liability of public authori-
ties in Canada. 
Prior toAnns, negligence on the part of the public authority did 
not automatically give rise to liability in tort. In Home Office v. Dorset 
Yacht,5 the Court of Appeal held that in determining liability of public 
authorities the first question that must be asked was whether the 
alleged act or omission was ultra vires. A public authority's act or 
omission would be ultra vires if the act was one which it had no 
jurisdiction to make or, in rare circumstances, ifthe act was tainted by 
a substantive defect such as irrationality, extreme unreasonableness, or 
improper purpose. The public law notion of ultra vires differentiated 
actions against local authorities from those against private individuals. 
In addition, a public authority could also be held liable for breach 
of statutory duty. With this type of action, the empowering legislation 
determined the scope of the duty owed by the public authority and the 
remedy available in the event of breach. 
In summary, beforeAnns, a public authority could be held liable 
for breach of statutory duty or, if the ultra vires hurdle was cleared, for 
negligence in common law. This situation meant that a public authority 
was less likely to be held liable for negligent acts or omissions than a 
private individual. 
Anns significantly increased the liability potential for public 
authorities. In the majority judgement, Lord Wilberforce states: 
The problem which this type of action creates is to define 
the circumstances in which the law should impose, over 
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and above, or perhaps alongside, these public law pow-
ers and duties, a duty in private law towards individuals 
such that they may sue for damages in a civil court. 6 
Prior to this decision, public authority liability was based on 
either statute (breach of statutory duty) or the common law. Lord 
Wilberforce implies that liability could be based on a combination of the 
two.7 · 
Lord Wilberforce increased the liability potential even further 
with his general duty of care formula. In the first step of his test, he 
asked whether there was sufficient proximity between the parties that 
damage to the plaintiff was a foreseeable outcome of carelessness on the 
part of the defendant. In the second step, he asked whether there were 
policy or other considerations which ought to limit or negate the prima 
facie duty established in the first step of his test. Because of the broad 
scope of the first step of this test, and the fact that the test was one that 
established a duty at the onset and then limited or negated the duty as 
a 'secondary' stage, this test favoured the plaintiff and thus expanded the 
liability potential of defendant public authorities. 
In an attempt to determine exactly when a public authority 
liability could arise, Lord Wilberforce distinguished between policy and 
operational decisions. 8 Policy decisions cover government choices prem-
ised on social, economic, or political factors. If made within the jurisdic-
tion conferred on the public authority, such choices are subject to judicial 
review only if one of the recognized grounds of substantive ultra vi res is 
proved. On the other hand, operational decisions, which involve the 
implementation of the decided policy, are reviewable under the Anns 
test. Lord Wilberforce states: 
Although this distinction .. .is convenient, and illuminat-
ing, it is probably a distinction of degree; many "opera-
tional" powers or duties have in them some element of 
"discretion." It can safely be said that the more "opera-
tional" a power or duty may be, the easier it is to 
superimpose upon it a common law duty of care. 9 
While this distinction is a useful concept, its practical application is 
fraught with difficulties. 
Lord Wilberforce also stated that public authorities could be 
held liable for failing to exercise their statutory powers.IO Conse-
quently, if the public authority was entrusted with a power, liability 
could arise with regards to either the manner in which the action was 
carried out or, ifthe power was deemed to be discretionary, the decision 
or lack of decision to exercise that power. This second situation covered 
instances where policy considerations enter the operational realm. 
In Kamloops v. Nielsen, the majority of the Supreme Court of 
Canada applied theAnns test. The court held that the public authority's 
duty to properly inspect building foundations extended to the prevention 
of continued construction and occupancy of buildings which had failed 
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to meet inspection standards. In the majority judgement, Madame 
Justice Wilson states: 
.. .I think that this is an appropriate case for the applica-
tion of the principle inAnns. I do not think the appellant 
can take any comfort from the distinction between non-
feasance and misfeasance where there is a duty to act or, 
at the very least, to make a conscious decision not to act 
on policy grounds. In my view inaction for no reason or 
inaction for improper reason cannot be a policy decision 
taken in the bona fide exercise of discretion.11 
In response to the argument that an expansion of the liability 
potential of public authorities might well expose them to "liability in an 
indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate 
class ... ".12 Madame Justice Wilson held that the Anns approach 
contained "its own built in barriers ... ".13 These included the relevant 
statute and the distinction between policy and operational decisions. 
In Murphy, the House of Lords categorically overruledAnns. It 
is significant that while counsel for the defendant in this case was 
prepared to concede that the District Authority did owe a common law 
duty to persons who might foreseeably suffer injury to their person or 
property, the law lords did not affirm the existence of such a duty. Lord 
Bridge states: 
... a duty of care of a scope sufficient to make the author-
ity liable ... can only be based on the principle ofreliance 
and ... there is nothing in the ordinary relationship of a 
local authority, as statutory supervisor of building op-
erations, and the purchaser of a defective building capa-
ble of giving rise to such a duty.14 
Importantly, Lord Keith states that the damage suffered inAnns was in 
fact purely economic loss.15 Lord Oliver expresses aversion to decisions 
in which public authorities shoulder the burden of paying for damages 
caused by negligent individuals.16 The Murphy decision severely re-
stricts the possibility of recovery for economic loss against public au-
thorities. 
In Murphy, the House of Lords also rejected theAnns concept of 
a prima facie duty of care.17 It favoured the approach taken by the 
Australian High Court in Sutherland Shire v. Heyman.18 In that case, 
Mr. Justice Brennan held: 
It is preferable in my view that the law should develop 
novel categories of negligence incremental and by anal-
ogy with established categories, rather than by a mas-
sive extension of a prima facie duty of care restrained 
only by indefinable "considerations which ought to nega-
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tive, or to reduce or limit the scope of the duty or the class 
of persons to whom it is owed".19 
One year prior to the Kamloops decision the Supreme Court of 
Canada, in R v. Saskatchewan Wheat Pool,20 refused to recognize 
breach of statutory duty as a nominate tort. Giving judgement for the 
majority, Mr. Justice Dickson, as he then was, held that such a breach 
should be considered under the ambit of the general law of negligence. 
This decision, which may be interpreted as supporting the use of a 
general duty of care, expands the liability potential of public authorities. 
Five years after Kamloops, in Just v. Right of British Colum-
bia, 21 the Supreme Court specifically addressed the distinction between 
policy and operational decisions made by public authorities. The court 
held that secondary policy decisions that fell within the operational 
sphere were subject to the common law of negligence; only pure policy 
decisions were immune from liability in negligence. Thus, on the facts of 
this case, only the initial decision to implement a highway inspection 
system could be classified as a policy decision. All subsequent decisions 
were to be reviewed on the operational level and subject to the common 
law duty of care. 
In 1989, in Rothfield v. Manolalws,22 the Supreme Court 
considered a situation similar to Kamloops. In this case, however, the 
plaintiffhomeowners negligently failed to observe the municipal by-law. 
While all of the justices agreed that the city was negligent, the effect of 
the homeowner's negligence was the subject of divergent opinion. Only 
Mr. Justice Cory held that the homeowner's negligence absolved the city 
from any liability.23 Mr. Justice La Forest stated that the homeowners 
were contributorily liable. 24 Madame Justice Wilson went even further; 
she stated that the homeowners should bear no responsibility at all.25 
This decision illustrates the court's readiness to hold public authorities 
liable in negligence. 
Since the House of Lords decision in Murphy, three Canadian 
cases have dealt with similar issues. In Petrie v. Groome,26 the British 
Columbia Supreme Court refused to follow Murphy. In this case, the 
District of North Vancouver was held liable for negligently approving 
building foundations. Although the private contl'actors were also held 
to be liable, judgement in full was entered against the municipality. 
This decision, which is currently under appeal, follows the current 
readiness to hold public authorities liable in negligence. 
In Arsenault v. Charlottetown City,27 the court followed Anns. 
In this case, the defendant city was held liable in negligence for failing 
to enforce its by-laws. In his judgement, Mr. Justice McQuaid states: 
"Anns, as interpreted by Kamloops ... nonetheless remains the law as it 
prevails in Canada ... ".28 Notably, however, the learned judge also 
quotes at length from Lord Keith's judgement in Murphy. This reference 
suggests that Mr. Justice McQuaid applies Anns with some reluctance. 
To date, the 1991 decision of Macaulay v. Wagorn29 is the only 
Canadian case that has followed Murphy. In this case, however, the 
action against the Crown was settled before trial and the case essentially 
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dealt with an action between private litigants. In his judgement, Mr. 
Justice Charron states: 
The House of Lords later revisited the Anns case in 
Murphy ... and, although it overruled the case in some 
respect, it confirmed that the principle of Donoghue v. 
Stephenson did indeed apply "so as to place the builder 
of premises under a duty to take reasonable care to avoid 
injury through defects in the premises to the person or 
property of those whom he should have in contemplation 
as likely to suffer such injury if care is not taken." 30 
Not only does this case follow Murphy, it suggests a possible alternative 
to the Murphy - Kamloops dilemma. 
As previously discussed, the House of Lords in Murphy did not 
categorically state that public authorities owed no duty at all to parties 
with whom they deal. It must be emphasized, however, that Murphy 
essentially dealt with recovery for economic loss. As Lord Keith states: 
Liability under the Anns decision is postulated on the 
existence of a presence of imminent danger to health or 
safety. But, considering that the loss involved in incur-
ring expenditure to avert the danger is pure economic 
loss, there would seem to be no logic confining the 
remedy to cases where such danger exists.31 
While the Murphy decision warns against classifying de facto 
economic loss as physical loss, it does not completely reject such recov-
ery. To recover for pure economic loss, a strong proximate relationship 
is required as well as an element ofreliance. A strict test for the recovery 
of economic loss was advocated by all of the law lords. 
In his article, "What Has Become of Anns?'',32 W.S. Schlosser 
refers to the words of Madame Justice Wilson in Kamloops. Madame 
Justice Wilson states: 
In order to obtain recovery for economic loss the statute 
has to create a private law duty to the plaintiff alongside 
the public duty ... Finally, and perhaps this merits some 
emphasis economic loss will only be recoverable if as a 
matter of statutory interpretation it is a type of loss the 
statute intended to guard against.33 
This quotation supports the idea that the decisions in Murphy and 
Kamloops can coexist; it suggests that the use of the Anns test in 
Kamloops will not automatically lead to recovery for pure economic loss. 
It is important to remember that while Murphy advocates an 
incremental approach to the law of negligence, the decision does not 
overrule the Donoghue v. Stephenson34 neighbour principle, nor does it 
overrule Dorset Yacht.35 Both of these cases may be considered as 
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specific examples of the incremental approach within the tort of negli-
gence. Consequently, if Kamloops can fit into an established tort 
category, or if it can be distinguished from Anns, it may be seen as 
compatible with the Murphy approach. 
In his article, Schlosser advocates a narrow view of Kamloops. 
He states that the duty of a municipality is "similar to that found in 
rescuer cases". 36 Thus, having taken an initial affirmative action to stop 
the negligent building, the city of Kamloops was obliged to follow 
through with that action according to reasonable standards. This 
analysis distinguishes Kamloops from Anns. 
Before predicting the effect that Murphy may have on the 
liability of public authorities in Canada, the policy issues underlying the 
Kamloops and Murphy decisions must be addressed. Anns emphasized 
accident compensation and loss distribution. The decision may be 
viewed as one in which the burden of damages is placed on the one who 
is in the best position to pay: the public authority. Sympathy for the 
plaintiff, in this case a private homeowner, and recognition of the fact 
that contractors and builders are notorious for 'escaping' liability sup-
port the expansion of the liability potential of public authorities. In 
Kamloops, Madame Justice Wilson states: 
The only area, in my view, which leaves scope for honest 
concern is ... where the operational subsumes what might 
be called secondary policy considerations, i.e. policy 
considerations at the secondary level. 37 
She continues : 
On the assumption that by and large municipalities and 
their officials discharge their responsibilities in a consci-
entious fashion, I believe that such a failure will be the 
exception rather than the rule and that the scope for 
application of the principle in Anns will be relatively 
narrow. I do not see it, as do some commentators, as 
potentially ruinous financially to municipalities. I do see 
it as a useful protection to the citizen whose ever-
increasing reliance on public officials seems to be a 
feature of our age ... 38 
The object of holding governmental authorities more accountable for 
their actions is seen as an important underlying consideration. 
Conversely, the House of Lords in Murphy emphasized the 
importance of adhering to strict legal principle. They abhorred a situa-
tion in which a public authority would be held liable for damages which 
were in fact caused by private individuals. To expand the liability of 
public authorities would discourage the maintenance of high building 
standards and adversely affect the private consumer. The House of 
Lords stressed that ifthere was a defect in the law with regards to the 
liability of public authorities, such a defect was to be remedied by 
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Parliament, not the judiciary. It is notable that in Canada, particularly 
since the advent of the Charter39, the Supreme Court has relaxed its 
strict adherence to the separation of powers doctrine. 
It is submitted that in both legal principle and underlying policy, 
the Canadian tradition follows Anns v. Merton. In determining the effect 
that Murphy will have on the future of liability of public authorities in 
negligence, it must be re-emphasized that Murphy primarily dealt with 
recovery for economic loss. By applying the criteria of close proximity 
and reliance set forth in Murphy, the Canadian courts could severely 
restrict recovery for economic loss in negligence actions against public 
authorities. They could thus restrict the liability potential of public 
authorities without contradicting Anns. 
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